Open CRS: Recent Reports

Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies: FY2009 Appropriations

Thu, 26 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

This report monitors actions taken by the 110th Congress for the FY2009 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill. On June 12, 2008, the House CJS Appropriations Subcommittee approved an FY2009 CJS appropriations bill that includes $5.1 billion more than the FY2008 enacted amount and $3.1 billion more than the FY2009 request, or about $59.7 billion in total funding ($56.8 billion in discretionary funding). The House subcommittee mark includes $8.7 billion for the Department of Commerce (DOC), $25.4 billion for the Department of Justice (DOJ), $24.7 billion for science agencies, among other amounts. The Administration's FY2009 request initially included $56.563 billion for those departments and agencies funded through the CJS appropriation, or $1.926 billion more than the enacted FY2008 appropriation of $54.637 billion (a 3.5% increase). For the DOC, the FY2009 request included $8.217 billion, or $1.360 billion more than the enacted FY2008 level (a 19.8% increase). The Census Bureau, however, is facing substantial funding shortfalls due to equipment failures associated with the 2010 decennial census. Congress is considering an FY2008 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2642) that includes an additional $210 million for Census. Also, the Administration submitted a budget amendment on June 9, 2008 that provides an additional $546 million for the 2010 Census, partly offset by cancelling $111 million in other Department of Commerce accounts and shifting amounts within the Census Bureau account. For the DOJ, the FY2009 request includes $23.089 billion, or $503 million less than the enacted FY2008 level (a 2.1% decrease). This decrease largely reflects a proposed reduction of $1.542 billion in funding for state and local law enforcement assistance, which was funded at $2.411 billion for FY2008. However, the FY2008 request also includes increases of $492.7 million for national security investigations, $100 million for a Southwest border crime fighting initiative, and $67.1 million to support essential federal detention and incarceration programs. In addition, the Administration has requested $185.8 million in FY2008 supplemental funding for DOJ counterterrorism activities and programs. By comparison, the House-passed FY2008 supplemental appropriations bill would provide DOJ with $407.3 million, and Senate-passed bill would provide $1.131 billion. For science agencies, the FY2009 request includes $24.474 billion, or $1.094 billion more than the enacted FY2008 level (a 4.7% increase). Among other things, the FY2009 request includes $396.8 million for the NSF and the National Nanotechnology Initiative. In addition, the Senate-passed FY2008 supplemental appropriation bill would provide the NASA with $200 million and the NSF with $200 million. For related agencies, the FY2009 request includes $784 million, or nearly $24.8 million less than the enacted FY2008 level (a 3.1% decrease). The Legal Services Commission would absorb this decrease, as the FY2009 request only includes $311 million for the commission, a reduction of $39.5 million, as compared to the commission's enacted FY2008 level of funding.

Veterans Benefits: An Overview

Wed, 25 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers a wide range of benefits and services to eligible veterans, members of their families, and survivors of deceased veterans. VA programs include disability compensation and pensions, readjustment benefits, and health care programs. The VA also provides life insurance, burial benefits, housing and other loan guaranty programs, and special counseling and outreach programs. While eligibility for specific benefits varies, veterans generally must meet requirements related to discharge type and length of active duty military service. This report provides an overview of major VA benefits and the VA budget. It will be updated as events warrant.

International Drug Control Policy

Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

This report provides an overview of U.S. international drug control policy. It describes major international counternarcotics initiatives and evaluates the broad array of U.S. drug control policy tools currently in use. The report also considers alternative counterdrug policy approaches to international drug control initiatives and raises several counterdrug policy issues and considerations for policy makers. Illegal drugs refer to narcotic, psychotropic, and related substances whose production, sale, and use are restricted by domestic law and international drug control agreements. The most common illegal drugs include cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and synthetic drugs. International trade in these drugs represents a lucrative and what at times seems to be an intractable criminal enterprise, affecting countries worldwide and generating between $100 billion and $1 trillion in illicit profits per year. Revenue from the illegal drug industry provides international drug trafficking organizations with the resources to evade and compete with law enforcement officials; penetrate legitimate economic structures through money laundering; and, in some instances, challenge the authority of national governments. Congress is involved in all aspects of U.S. international drug control policy, regularly appropriating funds for counterdrug initiatives, conducting oversight activities on federal counterdrug programs, and legislating changes to agency authorities and other counterdrug policies. U.S. programs to combat drug production and trafficking exist in the Andean region of South America, Afghanistan, and other areas of concern. Congress is also considering a proposed multiyear, $1.4 billion security assistance package to enhance existing U.S. efforts to combat drug trafficking and related criminal activity in Mexico and Central America. Despite apparent national resolve to address international narcotics trafficking, tensions appear between U.S. international drug control policy and other U.S. foreign policy goals and concerns. Pursuit of international drug control policies can sometimes negatively affect national interests by exacerbating political instability and economic dislocation in countries where narcotics production is entrenched economically and socially. Drug supply interdiction programs and U.S. systems to facilitate the international movement of legitimate goods, people, and wealth also are often at odds. The high priority of terrorism in U.S. foreign policy has resulted in increased attention to links between drug and terror groups; a challenge facing policy makers, however, is how to avoid diverting counterdrug resources for anti-terror ends in areas of potentially low payoff. This report expands and replaces RL33582, International Drug Trade and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Raphael F. Perl. It will be updated periodically.

Iran's Nuclear Program: Status

Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

Although Iran claims that its nuclear programs are exclusively for peaceful purposes, they have generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions, most recently in March 2008, which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues at its Natanz centrifuge facility to enrich uranium, expand the number of operating centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program," defined as "Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichmentrelated work," in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is "inherently reversible." Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the agency's concerns about Iran's enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report will be updated as necessary.

Possible Federal Revenue from Oil Development of ANWR and Nearby Areas

Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

Recent high petroleum prices, and the related economic burden on consumers and energy-intensive industries, has raised the issue of stimulating domestic supplies of crude oil. One possible source is the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is estimated to contain significant quantities of oil and gas. Interest in developing the ANWR oil resources has also focused on the revenues that the federal government could collect should exploration and development be successful. Some observers have suggested using such revenues for purposes such as providing relief to petroleum consumers, further subsidizing energy conservation measures, or reducing federal budget deficits. However, current federal law prohibits the production of oil and gas in ANWR. Federal revenues would consist primarily of corporate income taxes on profits earned by oil producers from the production and sale of ANWR oil. As landowner, the federal government would also collect royalties from such production on federal lands, which are included in the estimates. If producers were able to recover 10.3 billion barrels of oil over the life of the properties -- the United States Geological Survey has estimated there is a 50-50 chance that the ANWR coastal plain contains at least this amount of oil -- and if oil prices are $125/barrel, then the federal government might be able to collect $191 billion in revenues over the production period, estimated to be at least 30 years once production commences. This estimate consists of nearly $132 billion in federal corporate income taxes, and about nearly $59 billion in federal royalties. These estimates are subject to major limitations. Estimates of technologically recoverable oil used in this report include the resources from the federal lands, and assume the availability of resources in Native lands in the Refuge and offshore state lands. The Alaska Statehood Act would allot 90% of gross royalties to the state and 10% to the federal government. The federal government would collect revenues from bonus bids from federal leases, and rents on undeveloped leases. These are not estimated separately by CRS. Independent estimates by the Congressional Budget Office for President Bush's FY2009 budget proposal show estimated bonus bid revenues of $6 billion between FY2011 and FY2018. Finally, income tax revenues from the secondary feedback effects would also increase as a result of the stimulus to general economic activity. However, these revenues are not included here due to the difficulty in estimation over the projection time horizon.

Wind Power in the United States: Technology, Economic, and Policy Issues

Fri, 20 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

Rising energy prices and concern over greenhouse gas emissions have focused congressional attention on energy alternatives, including wind power. Although wind power currently provides only about 1% of U.S. electricity needs, it is growing more rapidly than any other energy source. In 2007, over 5,000 megawatts of new wind generating capacity were installed in the United States, second only to new natural gas-fired generating capacity. Wind power has become "mainstream" in many regions of the country, and is no longer considered an "alternative" energy source. Wind energy has become increasingly competitive with other power generation options. Wind technology has improved significantly over the past two decades. CRS analysis presented here shows that wind energy still depends on federal tax incentives to compete, but that key uncertainties like climate policy, fossil fuel prices, and technology progress could dominate future cost competitiveness. A key challenge for wind energy is that electricity production depends on when winds blow rather than when consumers need power. Wind's variability can create added expenses and complexity in balancing supply and demand on the grid. Recent studies imply that these integration costs do not become significant (5-10% of wholesale prices) until wind turbines account for 15-30% of the capacity in a given control area. Another concern is that new transmission infrastructure will be required to send the wind-generated power to demand centers. Building new lines can be expensive and time-consuming, and there are debates over how construction costs should be allocated among end-users and which pricing methodologies are best. Opposition to wind power arises for environmental, aesthetic, or aviation security reasons. New public-private partnerships have been established to address more comprehensively problems with avian (bird and bat) deaths resulting from wind farms. Some stakeholders oppose the construction of wind plants for visual reasons, especially in pristine or highly-valued areas. A debate over the potential for wind turbines to interfere with aviation radar emerged in 2006, but most experts believe any possible problems are economically and technically manageable. Federal wind power policy has centered primarily on the production tax credit (PTC), a business incentive to operate wind facilities. The PTC is set to expire on December 31, 2008. Analysts and wind industry representatives argue that the onagain off-again nature of the PTC is inefficient and leads to higher costs for the industry. While there is often bipartisan support for the PTC in Congress, debate centers more fundamentally on how to offset its revenue losses. A federal renewable portfolio standard -- which would mandate wind power levels -- was rejected in the Senate in late 2007; its future is uncertain. If wind is to supply up to 20% of the nation's power by 2030, as suggested by a recent U.S. Department of Energy report, additional federal policies will likely be required to overcome barriers, and ensure development of an efficient wind market.

Clean Water Act: Legislation Concerning Discharges from Recreational Boats

Thu, 19 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The Environmental Protection Agency is attempting to develop a regulatory response to a 2006 federal court ruling that vacated a long-standing rule that exempts discharges associated with the normal operation of vessels from permit requirements of the Clean Water Act. Concern that this ruling could require millions of recreational boaters to obtain permits has led to the introduction of legislation to exempt such vessels from water quality regulation. This report discusses background to the issue, six bills (S. 2067/H.R. 2550, S. 2766/H.R. 5949, and S. 2645/H.R. 5594), and draft permits proposed by EPA on June 17. In the 110th Congress, legislation concerning the applicability of certain environmental regulatory requirements to recreational boats has been introduced. Two bills are titled the Clean Boating Act of 2008 (S. 2766, Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Boxer; and H.R. 5949, Representative LaTourette). These identical bills have been ordered reported by Senate and House committees. Legislation titled the Recreational Boating Act of 2007 also has been introduced (S. 2067, Senator Martinez; and H.R. 2550, Representative Taylor1). Two other bills are the Vessel Discharge Evaluation and Review Act (S. 2645, Senator Stevens, and H.R. 5594, Representative Young2). These bills are intended to address an issue that has arisen in implementation of the Clean Water Act (CWA). In 2006, a federal court ordered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to revise a CWA regulation that currently exempts discharges from the normal operation of all vessels from the act's permit requirements.3 The bills seek to

Defense: FY2009 Authorization and Appropriations

Wed, 18 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The annual consideration of appropriations bills (regular, continuing, and supplemental) by Congress is part of a complex set of budget processes that also encompasses the consideration of budget resolutions, revenue and debt-limit legislation, other spending measures, and reconciliation bills. In addition, the operation of programs and the spending of appropriated funds are subject to constraints established in authorizing statutes. Congressional action on the budget for a fiscal year usually begins following the submission of the President?s budget at the beginning of each annual session of Congress. Congressional practices governing the consideration of appropriations and other budgetary measures are rooted in the Constitution, the standing rules of the House and Senate, and statutes, such as the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This report is a guide to one of the regular appropriations bills that Congress considers each year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense. For both defense authorization and appropriations, this report summarizes the status of the bills, their scope, major issues, funding levels, and related congressional activity. This report is updated as events warrant and lists the key CRS staff relevant to the issues covered as well as related CRS products.

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Might One Be Utilized In Iraq?

Mon, 16 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. In light of the "Declaration of Principles,"signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, and the possibility that the United States will enter into a SOFA with the Government of Iraq, there is considerable interest in Congress in SOFAs, what they may cover, and how they have been concluded in the past. Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations. SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement; rather, it establishes the rights and privileges of U.S. personnel present in a country in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFAs may be entered based on authority found in previous treaties and congressional actions or as sole executive agreements. There has been considerable interest in possible future security agreements between the United States and Iraq. The Administration has indicated that it intends to enter into two distinctive agreements. The first is a non-binding security agreement, and the second is a U.S.-Iraq SOFA. The SOFA may be unique from other SOFAs concluded by the United States in that it may contain authorization by the host government -- the government of Iraq -- for U.S. forces to engage in military operations within Iraq. The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. A list of current agreements is included at the end of this report categorized in tables according to the underlying source of authority, if any, for each of the SOFAs.

Boumediene v. Bush: Guantanamo Detainees' Right to Habeas Corpus

Mon, 16 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. The Court also found that � 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners' enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas. The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. This report summarizes the Boumediene decision and analyzes several of its major implications for the U.S. detention of alien enemy combatants and legislation that limits detainees' access to judicial review. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Kenneth R. Thomas.

Telework Legislation Pending in the 110th Congress: A Side-by-Side Comparison of Provisions

Wed, 11 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

S. 1000, the Telework Enhancement Act of 2007, and H.R. 4106, the Telework Improvements Act of 2008, are currently pending in the 110th Congress. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ordered S. 1000 to be reported, as amended, on November 14, 2007. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 4106 by voice vote under suspension of the rules on June 3, 2008. H.R. 4106 would amend Title 5 of the United States Code by adding a new Chapter 65 entitled "Telework." Under the legislation, the heads of executive branch agencies would be required to establish policies under which employees (with some exceptions) could be eligible to participate in telework. Legislative branch employees also would be covered by S. 1000. Agencies would have to establish policies on telework within 180 days after enactment of the acts. Employee participation in telework would be required to the maximum extent possible without diminishing either employee performance or agency operations. Executive branch employees not eligible for telework generally would include those whose duties involve the daily handling of secure materials, contact with persons, the use of special equipment, or physical presence. The legislation could require each executive branch agency to appoint a Telework Managing Officer, who would be responsible for implementing the telework policies. The agencies also would be required to provide training to managers, supervisors, and employees participating in telework. H.R. 4106 would require the Comptroller General to evaluate the telework policies in the executive branch. This report presents a side-by-side comparison of the provisions of S. 1000, as ordered to be reported, and H.R. 4106, as passed by the House. It will be updated as events dictate.

Potential Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Tue, 10 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

In February 2005, the Navy testified that the Navy in future years may require a total of 260 to 325 ships, or possibly 243 to 302 ships, depending on how much the Navy uses new technologies and a new ship crewing and deployment method called Sea Swap. In March 2005, the Navy provided a report to Congress showing the notional compositions of 260- and 325-ship fleets in FY2035.

Navy ambiguity regarding required numbers of ships, together with proposed reductions and delays in Navy ship-procurement programs in the FY2006-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), have caused concern among Members of Congress and others about future Navy capabilities and the shipbuilding industrial base. Ambiguity regarding required numbers of Navy ships may cause businessplanning uncertainty for companies that own shipyards, and may make it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to conduct effective oversight of the Navy budget and ship-procurement programs.

Historical figures for the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable yardstick for assessing the adequacy of today's Navy or a future planned Navy that includes a certain number of ships. Similarly, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change over time in the fleet's ability to perform its stated missions. Current force-planning issues that Congress may consider in assessing how large a Navy the United States needs include new technologies that may affect U.S. Navy ship capabilities; Navy ship homeporting arrangements and deployment methods; sea-based missile defense; the sea basing concept for conducting expeditionary operations ashore; naval requirements for the global war on terrorism and irregular conflicts; the possible emergence over the next 10 to 25 years of significantly more capable Chinese maritime military forces; DOD's increased emphasis on achieving full jointness in U.S. military operations; and potential tradeoffs between funding Navy requirements and funding competing defense requirements.

In assessing how many shipyards should be regularly involved in Navy shipbuilding in coming years, Congress may consider a number of factors, including shipyard production capacities, the potential shipbuilding rate for a fleet of 260 to 325 ships, the potential need to surge to a higher rate of production, the potential for creating new shipyards or reopening closed ones, shipyard fixed overhead costs, costs associated with split learning curves and government supervision of Navy shipbuilding work, competition in design and construction of Navy ships, regional labor markets, potential shipyard work other than Navy shipbuilding, the geographic base of support for Navy shipbuilding, and the distribution of the economic benefits of shipbuilding around the country. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76: Implications for the Future

Tue, 10 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

This report examines the issues surrounding the recent Walter Reed publicprivate competition conducted under OMB Circular A-76 and its potential impact on future Department of Defense competitions. Circular A-76 is a policy and a process first initiated in 1966 that was designed to determine whether federal employees or private sector contractors are best to perform activities deemed commercial. A series of articles that first appeared in the Washington Post chronicled the dilapidated conditions and the substandard medical treatment afforded to returning veterans. Media reports surrounding the competition have suggested that one possible contributing factor to the Walter Reed controversy was the decision to privatize base support services. Competitive sourcing through A-76 managed competitions is a major initiative of the Bush Administration's Presidential Management Agenda, and one of five government-wide initiatives to improve the management and performance of the federal government. In 2003, the Bush Administration revised OMB Circular A-76, the revision being a recommendation of the Commercial Activities Panel. There are a number of provisions in H.R. 1585, the House-passed FY2008 Defense Authorization bill, that would affect the A-76 policy and competition process. What caused the problems at Walter Reed? To what extent were the problems publicized in media reports related to the A-76 competition? Did it go badly because A-76 is an inherently flawed policy, or was it a convergence of events? Should Congress draw any conclusions from the outcome of the Walter Reed competition for future competitions on military medical facilities? While it may be hard to draw conclusions of cause and effect, there may be lessons learned applicable to future competitions. Some have suggested that constrained Army resources, due to a convergence of events, may have caused and/or contributed to the problems in the competition, and may have led to the attrition of skilled base support services staff. Other factors which may have affected the process were the entry of the United States into combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation for the consolidation of Army and Navy military medical services into a single tertiary hospital at the campus of the Bethesda Naval Hospital (effectively closing the Walter Reed campus), a surge in the number of outpatient medical care visits for veterans returning from the war; and the Army's push to achieve the Bush Administration's competitive sourcing goals. The Walter Reed A-76 competition is a case where a lot of things went wrong. Some assert that for some types of settings (like military medical facilities) conducting A-76 competitions may not be the most appropriate vehicle for saving money. Congress may want to act so that what happened at Walter Reed not happen elsewhere. This report will be updated as events warrant.

International Trade: Rules of Origin

Tue, 10 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

Determining the country of origin of a product is important for properly assessing tariffs, enforcing trade remedies (such as antidumping and countervailing duties) or quantitative restrictions (tariff quotas), and statistical purposes. Other commercial trade policies are also linked with origin determinations, such as country of origin labeling and government procurement regulations. Rules of origin (ROO), used to determine the country of origin of merchandise entering the U.S. market, can be very simple, noncontroversial tools of international trade as long as all of the parts of a product are manufactured and assembled primarily in one country. However, when a finished product's component parts originate in many countries, as is often the case in today's global trading environment, determining origin can be a very complex, sometimes subjective, and time-consuming process. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for determining country of origin using various ROO schemes. Non-preferential rules of origin are used to determine the origin of goods imported from countries with which the United States has most-favored-nation (MFN) status. They are the principal regulatory tools for accurate assessment of tariffs on imports, addressing country of origin labeling issues, qualifying goods for government procurement, and enforcing trade remedy actions and trade sanctions. Preferential rules are used to determine the eligibility of imported goods from certain U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners and certain developing country beneficiaries to receive duty-free or reduced tariff benefits under bilateral or regional FTAs, trade preference programs (such as the Generalized System of Preferences), and other special import programs. Preferential rules of origin are specific to each FTA, which means that they vary from agreement to agreement and preference to preference. This report deals with ROO in three parts. First, we describe in more detail the reasons that country of origin rules are important and briefly describe U.S. laws and methods that provide direction in making these determinations. Second, we discuss briefly some of the more controversial issues involving rules of origin, including the apparently subjective nature of some CBP origin determinations, and the effects of the global manufacturing process on ROO. Third, we conclude with some alternatives and options that Congress could consider that might assist in simplifying the process. This report will be updated as events warrant.

U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Mon, 09 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. This report discusses key policy issues related to that agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation and Russia's policies toward Iran. This report will be updated.

Israel: Background and Relations with the United States

Fri, 06 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel declared its independence and was immediately engaged in a war with all of its neighbors. Armed conflict has marked every decade of Israel's existence. Despite its unstable regional environment, Israel has developed a vibrant parliamentary democracy, albeit with relatively fragile governments. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon formed a three-party coalition in January 2005 to secure support for withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West Bank. In November, however, new Labor party leader Amir Peretz withdrew his party from the government and called for early elections. Sharon then resigned from his Likud party to form a new party, Kadima. On January 4, 2006, Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke; Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert succeeded Sharon. Kadima placed first in the March 28, 2006, Knesset (parliament) election, and Olmert formed a four-party coalition government. Israel has an advanced industrial, market economy in which the government plays a substantial role. The economy is now doing very well, and increased social spending is expected. Israel's foreign policy is focused largely on its region, Europe, and the United States. The government views Iran as an existential threat due to its nuclear ambitions and support for anti-Israel terrorists. Israel negotiated a series of agreements with the Palestinians in the 1990s, but the Oslo peace process ended in 2000, after the beginning of the intifadah or uprising against Israeli occupation. Israeli and Palestinian officials resumed contacts after the November 2004 death of Yasir Arafat. Both sides accepted but have not implemented the "Roadmap," the international framework for achieving a two-state solution to their conflict. Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza in summer 2005 and is constructing a security barrier in the West Bank to separate from the Palestinians. The victory of the Hamas terrorist group in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections has complicated Israeli-Palestinian relations and led Israeli officials to consider unilateral steps in the West Bank. Israel concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994, but never reached accords with Syria and Lebanon. It unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. European countries collectively are Israel's second largest trading partner, and the EU participates in the peace process. Since 1948, the United States and Israel have developed a close friendship based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security interests. U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations are multidimensional. The United States is the principal proponent of the Arab-Israeli peace process, but U.S. and Israeli views differ on various peace process issues, such as the fate of the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and Israeli settlements. The United States and Israel concluded a free-trade agreement in 1985, and the United States is Israel's largest trading partner. Since 1976, Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The two countries also have close security relations. Current issues in U.S.-Israeli relations include Israel's military sales to China, inadequate Israeli protection of U.S. intellectual property, and espionagerelated cases. See also CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. This report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB82008, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, and will be updated as developments warrant.

Financial Services and General Government (FSGG): FY2009 Appropriations

Fri, 06 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators (LSIs) -- Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress

Fri, 06 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

Some in Congress have expressed concern about the government's use of privatesector lead system integrators (LSIs) for executing large, complex defense-related acquisition programs. LSIs are large, prime contractors hired to manage such programs. Two LSI-managed programs -- the U.S. Army's Future Combat System (FCS) and the U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program -- have been strongly criticized by some observers because of cost and schedule overruns, and the potential for possible conflicts of interest. Supporters of the LSI concept argue that it is needed to execute certain large, complex acquisition efforts, and can promote better technical oversight and innovation. They assert that the use of LSIs result in an overall benefit for the government. Congress has several potential options regarding how and when LSIs might be used in the future. Section 115 of P.L. 109-364 requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress on the FCS lead system integrator. The 110th Congress has also introduced legislation (S. 680) to require the federal government to study the use of LSIs, and legislation which would prohibit the use of LSIs for remaining contracts under the Deepwater Program (S. 889). This report will be updated as events warrant.

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress

Fri, 06 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The Department of Defense (DOD) recently launched a major procurement initiative to replace all uparmored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in Iraq with Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles by FY2009. MRAPs have been described as providing twice as much protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) -- responsible for about 70% of U.S. casualties in Iraq -- than uparmored HMMWVs.1 The DOD's accelerated MRAP program raises a number of potential policy issues for congressional consideration. This report will be updated.

Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress

Thu, 05 Jun 2008 04:00:00 GMT

The Navy in FY2006 and future years wants to procure no more Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers and instead wants to begin procuring two new classes of surface combatants -- a new destroyer called the DD(X), and a smaller surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). In support of this plan, the Navy for FY2005 requested procurement funding for three final DDG-51s and initial procurement funding for the first DD(X) and the first LCS. Congress for FY2005 provided $3,445.0 million for procurement of three DDG51s. Congress also provided $350.5 million in advance procurement funding for the DD(X) program -- $221.1 million for the first DD(X), and $84.4 million for the second DD(X) -- and directed that procurement of DD(X)s be fully funded in the Navy's ship-procurement account rather than incrementally funded in the Navy's research and development account as the Navy had proposed for the first DD(X). Congress approved the Navy's plan to build the first LCS using research and development funds rather than shipbuilding funds, provided $214.7 million in procurement funding to fund the ship's entire construction cost (rather than about half the ship's cost, as the Navy had requested), required the next LCS (to be funded in FY2006) to be built to a second LCS design now being developed, prohibited the Navy from requesting funds in FY2006 to build a third LCS, and required all LCSs built after the lead ships of each design to be funded in the Navy's ship-procurement account rather than its research and development account. As part of the proposed FY2006 defense budget to be submitted to Congress in early February 2005, the Navy is expected to request additional advance procurement funding for the first DD(X) and procurement funding for the second LCS. The DD(X) and LCS programs raise several oversight issues for Congress. Potential options for Congress for the DD(X) program include approving the program as proposed by the Navy and supplementing the industrial base, if needed, with additional work; accelerating procurement of the lead DD(X) to FY2006 and the second DD(X) to FY2007; deferring procurement of the lead DD(X) to FY2008; procuring two or more DD(X)s per year; building DD(X)s at a single yard, or building each DD(X) jointly at two yards; terminating the DD(X) program now, or after procuring a single ship as a technology demonstrator, and supplementing the industrial base with additional work until the start of CG(X) cruiser procurement, and starting design work now on a smaller, less expensive alternative to the DD(X) and procuring this new design, rather than DD(X)s or CG(X)s, starting around FY2011. Options for Congress on the LCS program include shifting procurement funding for LCS mission modules to the Navy's ship-procurement account; procuring a few LCSs and then evaluating them before deciding whether to put the LCS into larger-scale series production; procuring LCSs at a rate of up to 10 per year; procuring LCSs at a rate of less than 5 per year; terminating the LCS program and instead procuring a new-design frigate; and terminating the LCS program and investing more in other littoral-warfare improvements.